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Abstract—In modern digital world, there is a strong demand
for efficient data streams processing methods. One of application
areas is cybersecurity — IPsec is a suite of protocols that adds
security to communication at the IP level. This paper presents
principles of high-performance FPGA architecture for data
streams processing on example of IPsec gateway implementation.
Efficiency of the proposed solution allows to use it in networks
with data rates of several Gbit/s.
Keywords—IPsec, FPGA, hardware implementation, data
streams processing
I. INTRODUCTION
ALONG with dynamic development of telecommunicationand multimedia in recent years, a strong demand for
efficient methods of data streams processing has emerged. Cy-
bersecurity is one of important areas, where they are utilized.
Data on the Internet are transmitted through multiple routers
and may be intercepted (packet sniffing). Cybercriminals use
also active attack methods, consisting of packet forging (packet
spoofing, man in the middle). Information is at risk not
only on the Internet — proper internal network perimeter
security is necessary. Economic globalization and necessity
of e-business profits protection prompted creation of adequate
safety mechanisms.
Internet of Things (verification and processing of data from
various sensors), wireless communication and video streams
processing (transcoding, multiscreen applications) are other
areas, where effective data streams processing systems can be
applied.
This paper describes the idea of hardware architecture for
high-performance data streams processing in FPGA on ex-
ample of IPsec gateway, which offers all features of IPsec
protocol suite and is efficient enough to be used in networks
with data rates of several Gbit/s.
Section II. presents fundamentals of IPsec protocol suite.
In section III. prototype of IPsec gateway is described and
possible areas of its improvement are mentioned. Section
IV discusses the principles of high-performance architecture
of completely functional IPsec gateway and its potential
is analyzed in section V. Section VI describes some other
possible applications of developed architecture. Section VII
concludes the paper.
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II. IPSEC STRUCTURE
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is network protocol suite
that protects communication over IP protocol. Its subprotocol
ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) provides confidential-
ity, integrity and authenticity of transmitted data.
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Fig. 1. IP packet secured with ESP protocol (transport and tunnel mode of
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Fig. 2. Architecture of IPsec system. Source: codeidol.com
Tunnel operation mode (fig. 1) allows for creation
of VPN networks. Original packet must be properly padded,
so it can be encrypted with block cipher (total message length
must be multiple of cipher’s block length). Padding contains
also part of the ESP protocol header (ESP trailer). Then packet
is ciphered and ESP header (ESP hdr) is added. It consists
of two fields: Security Parameter Index and Sequence Number.
First one is identificator of SA (Security Association) — logi-
cal connection between two network devices with set of cryp-
tographic attributes shared by them (e.g. cipher key) and the
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latter is countermeasure against replay attacks. At the end ICV
(Integrity Check Value) is appended (ESP auth, e.g. keyed-
hash Message Authentication Code – HMAC hash). After
recalculation of this value integrity and authenticity of the
packet can be verified. Finally, outer IP header is attached.
Fig. 2 presents the architecture of IPsec system. Security
Policy Database is reflection of corporate security policy.
SPD stores selectors (e.g. IP addresses, port numbers, etc.),
which are used by gateway to decide, whether (and possibly
how) each particular packet should be protected. Security
Association Database stores information necessary to secure
packet (e.g. encryption key). Internet Key Exchange module
is responsible for negotiation and automatic setup of new safe
channels (Security Association). Module marked as IPsec per-
forms all cryptographic operations and packet encapsulation.
There is a variety of available IPsec solutions. Open source
software implementations are suitable only for private use
(e.g. Linux OpenWRT distribution [1], designed for home
routers, which offers throughput of the order of several dozen
Mbit/s). More efficient solutions require significant hardware
resources (over a dozen processing cores) to achieve maximal
throughput of 1 Gbit/s (strongSwan project [2][3]). Commer-
cial implementations often use hardware support (e.g. Intel
IPsec library designed for Intel Architecture processors with
extended instruction set [4]). These solutions offer higher
throughputs (of the order of several Gbit/s, [5][6]), but are
expensive. There are commercial implementations of IPsec
using FPGAs [7] or GPUs [8], but they don’t provide all IPsec
features (e.g. IP traffic header processing or any IPsec database
functions).
III. PROTOTYPE DESIGN
Original goal of this paper authors was to develop IPsec
gateway, that implements all stages in FPGA and maximizes
benefits of hardware packet processing, in contrast to other
solutions that use hardware only for critical functions acceler-
ation. Solution was split into hardware data plane and software
control plane (including IKE module).
A prototype of IPsec gateway was designed [9] and its
analysis allowed to elaborate guidelines for next generation
product and generic efficient data streams processing archi-
tecture.
A. Prototype Implementation
Fig. 3 presents the scheme of packet-securing part of the
design (AST is abbreviation of AXI4-Stream interface). After
packet reception in Ethernet controller and when data link
layer header is stripped, pure IP packets are moved to sim-
ple security policy controller. Pearson’s hash is calculated
from IP header selectors, which is key in SPD database and
allows to find apropriate records. This module determines
whether data must be secured or can be transmitted through
bypass path. The entire data securing process is carried out
in IPsec outbound module. Subsequent processing steps are:
SAD database lookup to fetch particular SA attributes, ESP
encapsulation and DES encryption. The last step is SHA1-
based HMAC calculation and packet is stored in FIFO until
it is appended.
B. Prototype Performance Analysis
Prototype of IPsec gateway was tested with Terasic DE2-
70 developer board equipped with Altera’s Cyclone II FPGA.
Maximum clock frequency of the design was 86.72 MHz with
20% FPGA logic utilization.
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Using formula 1, where N – size of the packet, M – number
of cycles necessary for packet processing, F – maximum clock
frequency of the design, throughput of the IPsec gateway for
several packet lengths was computed (table I).
TABLE I
IPSEC GATEWAY PROTOTYPE PERFORMANCE
Packet size [byte] Cycles/packet Rb [Mbit/s]
64 520 85.39
240 784 209.70
1500 2682 437.44
The correctness of prototype operation was verified with
functional simulation and tests including packet generator
and sniffer (Ostinato and Wireshark respectively). Prototype
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Fig. 3. Block diagram of the prototype
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performance analysis allowed to identify three key elements
critical for throughput increase.
The main ”bottleneck” of the prototype is the module
responsible for HMAC hash calculation. HMAC algorithm
requires that SHA-1 digest is computed twice — for 240-
byte IP packet it takes 86% time of its processing (685 cycles
of total 794).
Another problem is the design of security processor —
IPsec functions are divided between security policy controller
and complex module performing all other operations. During
HMAC hash calculation stage, which is the longest one
in the whole process, resources responsible for IP and ESP
encapsulation or data encryption remain unused.
On the other hand, low FPGA logic utilization (20%)
of small by today’s standards Cyclone II FPGA allows for ap-
plication of hardware optimization methods, such as pipelining
and parallelization of the processing.
IV. IPSEC GATEWAY 2.0
The prototype analysis became the basis for development of
new hardware IPsec gateway architecture. Advanced hardware
optimization methods were applied for its implementation,
leading to increase in processing speed and better logic uti-
lization (fig. 4).
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Fig. 4. New IPsec gateway concept
As it was mentioned in section II, processing of ESP proto-
col consists of several suboperations that can be performed
independently. The only requirement is that they must be
subsequent for a particular packet, but couple of packets
can be processed simulatenously. The IPsec functions were
therefore divided into several sections of the design. What is
more, every section can contain many modules implementing
a specific stage of processing, working in parallel. Sections
are separated with FIFO queues and round robin switches,
which distribute packets between modules in particular sec-
tion. As a result, even more packets can be processed at
the same time. The utilization of switches enables controlling
the load of processing elements in given section. Increasing
the number of modules calculating the most time-consuming
HMAC resulted in throughput increase. Simplified applica-
tion of many different cryptographic algorithms (e.g. several
ciphers in various modes in ciphering section) is also great
advantage of presented architecture.
A. Internal Packet Header
New architecture concept allowed to vastly increase
throughput of the IPsec gateway, however a problem of sharing
Security Association attributes among modules in particular
sections arose. In the prototype (fig. 3) Security Association
Database is accessed by one complex module, which performs
also all other IPsec functions, but in IPsec gateway 2.0 packet
processing is distributed. Fetching SA attributes in every single
module would be huge load for the database and would be
extremely inefficient. Therefore it was decided that database
accesses will be performed in separate gateway section and
all the information will be transmitted along with the packet.
Fig. 5 presents structure of internal packet header before given
modules in IPsec gateway sections, which is transported using
TUSER sideband signal of AMBA AXI4-Stream [10] interface
together with IP data.
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Fig. 5. Internal packet header structure for various cryptographic algorithms
Packet, which was directed for securing in security pol-
icy controller, has a pointer to specific Security Association
Database row. After SAD access section all headers contain
routing field with information about next destination modules
(e.g. packet must be ciphered in AES-CBC module and ICV
at HMAC-SHA1 module must be appended). Packets before
encryption section (except the situation when no cipher is ap-
plied) have ciphering key and other information depending on
cipher operation mode [11][12] attached. Fig. 5 shows also
how the internal header is changed between sections — after
ciphering section all data necessary for encryption are stripped
and before HMAC section header contains only initial HMAC
hash values.
B. Packet Switch
Packet switch is the crucial element of this high-
performance and configurable architecture. It relays packets
basing on information from internal header and works as load-
balancer.
Concept of packet switch implementation is illustrated
in fig. 6. Module has N inputs connected to long FIFOs —
these are actual packet buffers. FIFOs connected to M outputs
are short, because they must buffer only one packet, which is
currently being processed by destination module.
Switch contains also two internal sets of FIFOs — queue
and type, respectively. First one allows to register all incoming
packets with given destination address (in fact destination
module type). Number of output connected to module of given
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type, which is ready to process next packet, is stored in the
second FIFO set.
Finite-state machine 1 (FSM1) controls queue FIFO set.
It periodically checks input FIFOs and whenever one contains
valid data, destination module type is read from routing header
and number of this input is written into queue FIFO assigned
to this type.
FSM3 is responsible for type FIFO set. It periodically reads
type and busy control inputs and whenever destination module
signalizes its availability, number of this output is written into
type FIFO assigned to this type.
The most important function is performed by FSM2. It mon-
itors outputs of queue FIFO set and when it finds valid data,
it checks appropriate FIFO from type set (where information
about availability of desired destination module is stored).
If free resource is found, FSM creates connection between
input and output and packet is transmitted.
Routing header may be also potentially used to distinguish
between traffic classes within the design. Some modules
in given section can be designated only to process high-priority
traffic (e.g. part of AES-CBC encryption modules). Seperate
type identifier must be assigned to them and then it must
be included in routing header of high-priority packets.
C. HMAC-SHA1 Module Optimizations
In order to improve performance of IPsec gateway, opti-
mizations of individual modules were also performed. Special
attention was devoted to HMAC-SHA1 module, because its
efficiency was the crucial processing speed curtailment in the
prototype. Fig. 7 presents HMAC algorithm [13].
SHA-1 hash is calculated from IP packet with prepended
i key pad value. String of bits is split into 512-bit blocks,
which are processed individually by hash algorithm. In the
second stage, o key pad value is prepended to previously
calculated hash and the whole procedure is repeated. Finally,
160-bit HMAC hash is obtained, ready to be appended to the
secured packet. I key pad and o key pad blocks are the result
i_key_pad IP
HASH1o_key_pad
HASH2 =   HMAC
SHA1
SHA1
512
Fig. 7. HMAC-SHA1 algorithm scheme
of XOR operation performed on the key and two constants
defined in RFC 2104 [13].
The same key is used for all IP packets being secured
by one SA channel. This means that SHA-1 hashes of blocks
i key pad and o key pad can be calculated in advance, right
after SA negotiation process and stored in Security Association
Database instead HMAC key. SHA-1 submodule in HMAC-
SHA1 processor has only to be initialized with these precal-
culated values during ICV calculation — they are included
in internal packet header (fig. 5). This optimization shortens
the HMAC calculation by 160 clock cycles (processing time
of two 512-bit blocks in SHA-1 algorithm before further
optimizations – in IPsec gateway prototype).
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Fig. 8. SHA1 algorithm unfolding – critical path problem. Based on: [15]
Another important task is reduction of time required for
512-bit block processing in SHA-1 algorithm [14]. Unfortu-
nately, hardware algorithm’s loop unrolling (e.g. calculation of
2 of 80 rounds in one clock cycle) results in the extension of
the design’s critical path (fig. 8), because extra addition must
be performed during the same clock cycle. This leads to the
decrease of design maximum frequency.
The solution of this problem was proposed in paper [15].
SHA-1 algorithm was modified by adding new variables —
some calculations can be moved one round earlier than in
unmodified algorithm, because their inputs are already known
(values derived from previous round). That way extra addition
can be avoided when unrolling the algorithm’s loop. Imple-
mentation of the improved algorithm decreased the time of
the 512-bit block processing to 40 clock cycles (from the
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initial 80) without causing a drop in the design’s maximum
frequency.
D. Other Architecture Optimizations
The width of the internal bus was increased from 64 to
128 bits (size of the AES block) in order to improve the
performance. Two parallel DES pipelines (64-bit width) were
placed in DES-ECB ciphering modules.
The use of many parallel processing cores created a problem
in providing access to Security Association Database. To solve
this, appropriate arbiter system was designed. Moreover, the
accesses to the database were moved to a separate clock
domain, because the DDR memory can usually be clocked
with much higher frequency than other design parts.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The design was tested with new Terasic DE5-Net developer
board equipped with Altera’s Stratix V FPGA. Synthesis of the
IPsec gateway in various configurations (with varying number
of particular modules in the gateway sections) was conducted.
Table II presents synthesis results for DES configurations.
In the Configuration column, numbers of security policy
controllers, SAD controllers, ciphering modules and HMAC
modules in every section were listed respectively.
TABLE II
DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR DES CONFIGURATIONS
Configuration Fmax [MHz] Logic utilization
4/4/4/4 102.79 16%
4/4/4/8 104.04 20%
8/8/8/16 100.65 38%
The same throughput estimation method as in the prototype
was used to compute the throughput of every configuration.
It must be noted that benefits of the new architecture are
visible when packet stream is being processed. In tables III, IV
and V, throughput (Mbit/s) for miscellaneous packet streams
is presented.
TABLE III
THROUGHPUT FOR 64-BYTE PACKETS
Configuration
Count of packets in stream
16 32 64 128
4/4/4/4 1137.91 1253.06 1319.84 1355.97
4/4/4/8 1691.06 2029.28 2254.75 2387.38
8/8/8/16 1940.06 2780.86 3550.16 4120.05
TABLE IV
THROUGHPUT FOR 240-BYTE PACKETS
Configuration
Count of packets in stream
16 32 64 128
4/4/4/4 2363.55 2526.17 2616.16 2663.61
4/4/4/8 3699.20 4342.54 4756.11 4979.33
8/8/8/16 4218.24 5784.79 7103.89 8018.07
TABLE V
THROUGHPUT FOR 1500-BYTE PACKETS
Configuration
Count of packets in stream
16 32 64 128
4/4/4/4 3239.63 3403.22 3478.30 3526.33
4/4/4/8 6139.47 7168.50 7732.62 8081.76
8/8/8/16 6185.03 7975.65 9291.33 10227.44
Similar tests were conducted for IPsec gateway using AES
block cipher in CBC mode, which is more advanced than DES.
Because the most time-consuming part in this configuration
is the ciphering process, the number of ciphering modules
in section was increased. Table VI presents synthesis results
for AES configurations, while design throughput for miscel-
laneous packet streams is shown in tables VII, VIII and IX.
TABLE VI
DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR AES CONFIGURATIONS
Configuration Fmax [MHz] Logic utilization
4/4/6/4 94.07 27%
8/8/12/8 97.98 34%
TABLE VII
THROUGHPUT FOR 64-BYTE PACKETS
Configuration
Count of packets in stream
16 32 64 128
4/4/6/4 830.411 973.01 1064.39 1116.84
8/8/12/8 1254.14 1658.37 1976.98 2187.06
TABLE VIII
THROUGHPUT FOR 240-BYTE PACKETS
Configuration
Count of packets in stream
16 32 64 128
4/4/6/4 1711.98 1990.24 2166.29 2266.53
8/8/12/8 2537.90 3355.57 4056.53 4424.76
TABLE IX
THROUGHPUT FOR 1500-BYTE PACKETS
Configuration
Count of packets in stream
16 32 64 128
4/4/6/4 2598.65 2755.95 3032.10 3076.89
8/8/12/8 3362.10 4580.40 4961.40 5518.80
VI. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPED
ARCHITECTURE
Hardware acceleration of data processing is widely used
nowadays and therefore there are many possible application
areas of presented architecture. Authors discuss some of them.
A. Intrusion Detection/Prevention System
Intrusion Detection System is a device that monitors
network for malicious activity (using signature-based and
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anomaly-based methods) and alarms network administrator
whenever something suspicious is detected. Intrusion Preven-
tion System is extended version of IDS — besides standard
functionality, it is capable of blocking detected attacks. Net-
work traffic is split into flows to allow its analysis. Each of
them is identified with set of values (e.g. IP address, port
numbers, data from application layer headers, etc.).
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Fig. 9. Block diagram of Intrusion Prevention System
Concept of IPS implementation is illustrated in fig. 9. Stages
of data processing were divided into sections as in IPsec gate-
way. At first packets are sorted in several layers corresponding
to network protocol stack, in order to create group of flows
that share some common features. This divides main task
to subproblems and moreover allows for load balancing of
subsequent section (Memory controllers), which is responsible
for counting packets belonging to given flows and storing
this information in databases. Software control plane analyzes
gathered data and should detect possible threats. If necessary
it alarms network administrator (IDS responsibility), but also
configures set of packet filteres at the end of the device
to prevent malicious packets from entering the network.
B. Wireless Communication
Another area, where presented architecture could be used,
is wireless communication. Radio channel characteristic and
its high variability enforces application of various checksums
and forward error correction methods along with adaptive
coding and modulation.
Fig. 10 presents simplified, generic diagram of wireless
transmitter (based on [16]). Multiple video streams can be data
to transmit. At first stream configuration must be performed
— initial configuration is read from the database and can be
modified by device control plane depending on radio channel
condition (ACM). In subsequent sections CRC is calculated
and redundant bits are added (there can be more than one FEC
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Fig. 10. Block diagram of simplified wireless transmitter
layer). At the end constellation mapping is done and packet
is transmitted.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents high-performance and configurable
FPGA architecture for data streams processing and process
of its formation during hardware implementation of IPsec
gateway in FPGA. Thanks to the use of advanced designing
methods and the optimization typical for digital circuits imple-
mentation, high processing speed was achieved. Created device
can compete with commercial IPsec solutions, especially these
implemented in FPGA [7]. Architecture of this design is strong
basis for future hardware accelerators implementations.
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